Last updated September 21, 2026
Denali 1967 Disaster: The Wilcox Expedition
In July 1967, twelve climbers from two combined parties climbed Denali by the historic Muldrow Glacier–Karstens Ridge route. Five came down from high camp before a violent storm locked onto the upper mountain. Seven remained above. Six made a second summit push in whiteout conditions while Steve Taylor stayed at the 17,900-foot camp. None of the seven returned. The disaster remains the deadliest single climbing accident in Denali’s history.
What happened to the Wilcox Expedition on Denali in 1967?
A twelve-man combined expedition climbed Denali from the north by the Muldrow Glacier and Karstens Ridge. Four climbers—Joe Wilcox, Howard Snyder, Jerry Lewis and Paul Schlichter—summited in good weather on July 15. On July 17, those four plus Anshel Schiff descended from the 17,900-foot high camp to 15,000 feet to conserve food and fuel. Six of the seven men left above made a second summit attempt; Steve Taylor remained at camp because he was ill. The summit party radioed on July 18 from high on the mountain in whiteout conditions. A prolonged, exceptionally violent storm then engulfed the upper mountain. All seven men above the lower survivors died.
Seven Deaths on a Route Where Rescue Was Nearly Impossible
The event predates Denali’s modern West Buttress infrastructure, high-altitude ranger camps, satellite communication and helicopter capability.
The Wilcox Expedition Climbed the Muldrow Glacier–Karstens Ridge Route
The route used Denali’s original north-side approach: from Wonder Lake and the McKinley River toward McGonagall Pass, then up the Muldrow Glacier, Karstens Ridge and Harper Glacier to Denali Pass and the South Summit. It is not the modern standard West Buttress route.
1967 route landmarks
This is broad historical orientation rather than an exact reconstruction of every 1967 camp.
The Muldrow Route Was Remote Even Before the Climbing Began
Unlike today’s ski-plane access to the Kahiltna Glacier, the historic Muldrow expedition required an overland approach from the north and a long journey through the glacier system before reaching the upper mountain.
The Wilcox Party and the Colorado Party Combined
The twelve climbers did not begin as a single cohesive team. Joe Wilcox’s group joined with a three-man Colorado party led by Howard Snyder. The 1968 American Alpine Club accident analysis later described the combined party as relatively inexperienced for an expedition of this scale.
Nine climbers
Joe Wilcox, Jerry Clark, Hank Janes, Dennis Luchterhand, Mark McLaughlin, John Russell, Anshel Schiff, Steve Taylor and Walter Taylor.
Seven of these nine would die.Three climbers
Howard Snyder, Jerry Lewis and Paul Schlichter joined the larger expedition when their own team fell below the required party size.
All three survived and summited on July 15.12 climbers
The team shared the Muldrow/Karstens route, camps, radios, food and summit strategy.
Five survived; seven died high on Denali.The First Summit Party Climbed in Excellent Weather
Joe Wilcox, Howard Snyder, Jerry Lewis and Paul Schlichter left the 17,900-foot camp around noon on July 15. The detailed 1968 accident report says they reached the South Summit at approximately 6:30 p.m. in clear conditions and returned to high camp around 9:50 p.m.
The contrast with the second summit push is central to the disaster. The first group had visibility and relatively favorable weather. The second group would spend a night out, reach the upper mountain in cloud and begin descending into a storm that became far more violent.
Four July 15 summiteers survived.
Wilcox, Snyder, Lewis and Schlichter later descended to 15,000 feet. Anshel Schiff, who had not summited, descended with them. Those five became the expedition’s survivors.
The Final Summit Push Began After a Storm Had Already Tested the Team
The 1968 American Alpine Club accident report provides the most detailed contemporaneous sequence, although later books disagree over how some decisions should be interpreted.
Strong winds trapped all twelve at high camp
After the first summit party returned, winds around the upper mountain kept the entire team at the 17,900-foot camp.
Five descended to 15,000 feet
Wilcox, Snyder, Schlichter, Schiff and Lewis left high camp to conserve food and fuel. Seven men remained above.
Six started for the summit
Jerry Clark, Hank Janes, Dennis Luchterhand, Mark McLaughlin, John Russell and Walter Taylor departed. Steve Taylor stayed at the 17,900-foot camp because he felt ill.
The summit party radioed from cloud
They reported poor visibility, difficulty locating the trail and a decision to bivouac on the upper mountain rather than return immediately to high camp.
Final radio contact from the upper mountain
The AAC record says the six-man party reported reaching the South Summit in dense overcast and preparing to descend. Other reconstructions suggest John Russell may have turned back before the top. With no survivors from the group, his exact high point remains uncertain.
The storm intensified
No further radio message came from the seven men above. The storm continued with only brief lulls for days.
Why sources disagree about whether five or six reached the summit
The 1968 AAC climb summary says all six radioed from the summit. Later reconstructions based on radio details argue that five may have reached the top while Russell had turned back. Because none of the six survived, this page treats Russell’s exact high point as unresolved.
Above 19,000 Feet, Visibility Can Become a Survival System
The second summit party had to locate a high camp across exposed upper terrain in whiteout and extreme wind after a long summit effort. On Denali, route finding and shelter can become inseparable once weather closes in.
The Men Lost in the 1967 Wilcox Expedition
The names and ages below follow the 1968 American Alpine Club accident report and NPS historical fatality records. Older publications contain occasional spelling errors, especially “Luchterland” for Luchterhand and “Hank James” for Henry Janes.
Only three bodies were ever located—and none was positively identified.
The Mountaineering Club of Alaska search party found one body at the destroyed high camp and two near Archdeacon’s Tower. The conditions prevented positive identification. The other four climbers were never found.
The Survivors Were Below the Fatal Group When the Storm Locked In
The five survivors had descended to roughly 15,000 feet before the upper mountain became impassable. They were still trapped by the storm and suffered exhaustion and frostbite, but their lower position gave them a margin the seven above did not have.
Joseph F. Wilcox
Expedition leader and July 15 summiteer.
Later wrote White Winds and disputed parts of the early accident narrative.Howard H. Snyder
Colorado party leader and July 15 summiteer.
Later wrote The Hall of the Mountain King.Paul Schlichter
Colorado climber and July 15 summiteer.
His later interviews helped reconstruct the expedition.Jerry Lewis
Colorado climber and July 15 summiteer.
Descended with the lower group on July 17.Anshel Schiff
Wilcox-party member who did not summit.
Descending before the storm became decisive.Position mattered
The five survivors were not safe because the storm was mild below. They survived because they had more shelter, supplies and route margin at lower elevation.
The seven above had almost none.How Severe Was the 1967 Denali Storm?
The answer depends on what is directly documented versus what was reconstructed later. The safest historical description is that an exceptionally violent storm struck the upper mountain and persisted with minor lulls for several days.
| Evidence | What it supports | What it does not prove |
|---|---|---|
| 1968 AAC / NPS record | A violent, prolonged storm trapped the upper party during descent. | An exact wind speed at Archdeacon’s Tower or high camp. |
| Survivors at 15,000 ft | Severe wind and weather continued for days even well below the summit. | That conditions at 15,000 ft matched conditions near 20,000 ft. |
| Later meteorological reconstruction | Upper-mountain winds may have reached extraordinary values, with modern articles citing modeled gusts well above 100 mph. | That a 300 mph number was a direct instrument measurement on the summit ridge. |
| Search evidence | Tents were destroyed, bodies were found exposed or bivouacked, and fresh snow quickly buried the scene. | The exact sequence of each climber’s final movements. |
There Is No Responsible Historical Basis for Reducing 1967 to One Person’s Mistake
The early accident analysis, survivor books and later historical reviews disagree over warning, leadership and responsibility. What they share is a picture of multiple vulnerabilities converging with an extreme storm.
Multiple contributing factors
The AAC analysis described a large, inexperienced combined party, exhaustion, poor condition among some upper climbers, supply pressure and the fatal group’s decision to bivouac rather than descend when cloud enveloped them.
It explicitly called the tragedy complex, with no single simple cause.Did the team receive advance warning?
The 1968 analysis said a Park Service radio report warned of a major storm around July 16–17. Wilcox later published radio-log documentation disputing that claim.
The AAC review of White Winds said the logs did not show an advance storm alert.Wilcox received heavy criticism
Contemporary criticism focused on his youth, expedition organization and decision to descend while weaker climbers remained high. Later accounts challenged the idea that he alone caused the disaster.
The evidence supports analysis, not a courtroom-style verdict.The fatal group made its own summit decisions
The 1968 accident analysis emphasized that the group above chose to continue and bivouac in deteriorating conditions after the five survivors had descended.
Leadership and individual decisions overlapped.An extraordinary storm changed the outcome
The same 1968 analysis said the outcome might have been very different had the storm not struck when it did.
A hazardous decision is not the same thing as a guaranteed fatality.No witness saw the final hours
The seven climbers who died left no complete record after the last radio contact.
Every reconstruction contains inference.
Fresh Snow Buried the Evidence Before a Full Reconstruction Was Possible
Searchers reached the high mountain days after the last radio call. By the August follow-up search, new snow had covered camps, tracks and remains that might have answered more questions.
The Mountaineering Club of Alaska Became the Search Party
Another expedition was climbing the same north-side route below the Wilcox team. When it became clear that seven men were missing, the Mountaineering Club of Alaska party turned its climb into a search.
The search group moved higher
The battered five survivors began descending while members of the MCA expedition continued toward the high camp.
One body found at the 17,900-foot camp
Searchers reached the demolished high camp and found one victim there. Contemporary accounts assumed it might be Steve Taylor, but there was no positive identification.
Two bodies found near Archdeacon’s Tower
Two more victims were located high on the summit ridge. Evidence suggested they had attempted to bivouac and descend in the storm. Neither was positively identified.
A dedicated search returned
A follow-up party including Vin Hoeman and Ray Genet searched the high mountain. New snow had buried the sites, and no additional bodies were found.
Four climbers were never located.
Even the three bodies found in July were later buried by snow and could not be recovered. Denali remains the resting place of all seven men.
What Contributed to the Wilcox Expedition Disaster?
The historical sources support several interacting factors. They do not support a clean equation in which removing one factor guarantees survival.
| Factor | Historical evidence | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|
| Extreme storm | All major records describe a violent multi-day storm on the upper mountain. | Destroyed shelter, erased visibility, slowed movement and made outside rescue unrealistic. |
| Late summit departure | The second group had not left high camp by about 2 p.m. on July 17. | Committed the climbers to an overnight bivouac or very late return at extreme altitude. |
| Fatigue / illness | Several climbers had been exhausted, short of sleep, ill or affected by altitude before the second push. | Reduced pace and margin once weather deteriorated. |
| Food and fuel pressure | Five climbers descended partly to conserve limited supplies at high camp. | High camp had less redundancy than a modern heavily stocked expedition camp. |
| Whiteout navigation | The summit party radioed that it was having difficulty locating the trail. | Finding the route and high camp became harder precisely when shelter mattered most. |
| Communication limits | Small radios worked inconsistently and rescue capability was minimal by modern standards. | The lower party could not guide or rescue the upper group once contact ended. |
| Experience | The 1968 analysis judged the party’s overall experience low for a major Denali expedition. | Extreme conditions leave less room for learning expedition judgment on the mountain. |
Weather Forecasting Improved. Denali Did Not Become Predictable.
Modern teams have better forecasts, satellite communication and rescue systems, but the National Park Service still emphasizes self-sufficiency because wind, visibility, altitude and terrain can make timely rescue impossible.
What Is the Muldrow Glacier Route Like Today?
More than 90% of modern Denali climbers use the West Buttress. The Muldrow Glacier remains historically important, but its lower glacier surged dramatically in 2021 and changed the route.
The glacier surged
The lower Muldrow fractured heavily, making the historic north-side line far more complex.
NPS initially described large sections as apparently impassable.Rangers returned to scout it
An NPS patrol reached the base of the Hill of Cracks and reported that the route “may” go with difficult bypasses and overhead hazard.
No climbing team had used the historic route since 2019.Conditions remain evolving
The current NPS FAQ still advises teams to do extensive research and notes major logistical complications on the north side.
Do not use a 1967 route description for a modern attempt.
The 1967 Disaster Still Occupies an Outsized Place in Denali’s Fatality Record
Seven deaths in one expedition are dramatic, but they should not be converted into a modern personal probability. Denali’s route traffic, rescue systems, registration rules and climber population have changed substantially since 1967.
How Much Does 1967 Matter in the Long-Term Record?
The peer-reviewed Denali fatality study examined 96 deaths from 1903 through 2006 and calculated 3.08 deaths per 1,000 summit attempts. The seven Wilcox-expedition deaths account for about 7.3% of those 96 fatalities—but that does not mean 7.3% of Denali’s modern risk comes from storms.
The more important modern finding is that Denali fatalities are concentrated on descent.
The peer-reviewed study found that 61% of fatalities occurred during descent. The 1967 disaster is historically consistent with that broader pattern: the fatal summit party’s final known movement was downward from the upper mountain.
Direct Answers About the Wilcox Expedition
Where the sources disagree, the answer preserves that uncertainty rather than forcing one reconstruction.
How many climbers died in the 1967 Denali disaster?
Seven climbers died: Jerry Clark, Hank Janes, Dennis Luchterhand, Mark McLaughlin, John Russell, Walter Taylor and Steve Taylor.
Who survived the Wilcox Expedition?
Five men survived: Joe Wilcox, Howard Snyder, Paul Schlichter, Jerry Lewis and Anshel Schiff. Wilcox, Snyder, Schlichter and Lewis had summited on July 15; Schiff had not.
What route did the Wilcox Expedition climb?
The combined expedition climbed from the north via the Muldrow Glacier and Karstens Ridge, continuing up the Harper Glacier toward Denali Pass and the South Summit.
Did all six members of the second summit party reach the top?
The 1968 American Alpine Club climb summary says the six-man party radioed from the summit. Later reconstructions suggest five may have summited while John Russell turned back. Because no member of that group survived, Russell’s exact high point remains uncertain.
How bad was the 1967 Denali storm?
Contemporary records describe an incredibly violent storm that lasted for days. Later meteorological modeling has produced very high wind estimates, but exact summit-ridge wind speeds were not directly measured in 1967.
Was Joe Wilcox blamed for the disaster?
Wilcox received substantial criticism after the accident, especially over leadership, experience and weather decisions. The 1968 accident analysis, however, called the event complex and said no single simple cause explained it. Wilcox later disputed the claim that the expedition had received a clear advance warning of the fatal storm.
Were the seven bodies recovered?
No. Searchers found three bodies but could not positively identify or remove them. Four climbers were never located, and later snow buried the sites.
Is the Muldrow Glacier route still climbed?
It is historically important but rarely used today. The 2021 Muldrow Glacier surge dramatically changed the lower route. A 2026 NPS patrol reported that portions may be navigable with difficult bypasses and overhead hazard, while NPS continues to advise extensive research before any attempt.
The Best Record Combines the 1968 Accident Report With Later Survivor Accounts
No source can reconstruct the seven men’s final hours completely. The most responsible history keeps contemporaneous evidence, survivor testimony and later analysis separate.
The Storm Was Real. So Were the Decisions That Put Seven Climbers in Its Path.
The Wilcox Expedition should not be remembered as a morality play with one villain or one mistake. A late summit effort, exhausted climbers, limited supplies, whiteout navigation, uncertain forecasting, weak communication and an exceptional storm converged on an upper mountain where rescue was effectively impossible. Seven men died. Five survived below them. Nearly sixty years later, the unanswered questions are part of the history—but so is the clarity of the larger lesson: on Denali, margin is a survival system.
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