Last updated September 18, 2026
Nanga Parbat 1970: The Messner Tragedy
On June 27, 1970, Reinhold and Günther Messner made the first ascent of Nanga Parbat’s immense Rupal Face. They did not descend the way they had climbed. The brothers crossed onto the Diamir side, where Günther disappeared and died. Reinhold survived with severe frostbite. Decades of accusation followed—until remains found on the Diamir side in 2005 changed what could still reasonably be disputed.
How Did Günther Messner Die on Nanga Parbat?
The strongest surviving evidence is that Günther Messner died during the brothers’ descent of the Diamir Face, most likely in or near an avalanche on the lower mountain. Reinhold Messner said Günther disappeared after the two had descended together for days from the summit and that he found fresh avalanche debris when he went back to search.
What cannot be reconstructed with certainty is Günther’s exact final moment. No one witnessed the disappearance. The discovery of his remains on the Diamir side in 2005, followed by DNA identification, strongly supports the central part of Reinhold’s account—that Günther crossed the mountain and descended the Diamir side with him. It does not prove every detail of the descent, the precise place of death, or every disputed decision made above 8,000 meters.
What We Know
- Reinhold and Günther both reached the summit on June 27, 1970.
- The ascent completed the first climb of the Rupal Face.
- The brothers descended onto the Diamir side rather than returning down the Rupal Face.
- Günther died during that descent; Reinhold survived and reached the Diamir Valley.
- Remains found on the Diamir side were identified as Günther’s by DNA testing in 2005.
What Remains Disputed or Unseen
- Whether Reinhold had considered a traverse before the emergency developed.
- Exactly what was communicated to Felix Kuen and Peter Scholz near the summit ridge.
- How impaired Günther was at each stage of the descent.
- The exact moment and mechanism of Günther’s death.
- How much glacial movement shifted the remains between 1970 and their later discovery.
Nanga Parbat 1970: Evidence, Timeline & Controversy
They Climbed the South Side and Came Down the West Side
That geographic fact is the key to understanding both the achievement and the later controversy. The Rupal Face and Diamir Face are opposite sides of an enormous 8,000-meter mountain.
Rupal Base Camp · Summit · Diamir Side
The map shows the three geographic anchors of the 1970 story. It is not a reconstruction of the exact climbing line or the location of Günther’s death.
The Rupal Face Was One of Himalayan Climbing’s Great Unfinished Problems.
Herrligkoffer-led expeditions had already pushed high on the face in 1964 and 1968. In 1970 the objective was not simply another Nanga Parbat ascent—it was the first complete climb of the enormous Rupal wall.
The Messners Were Part of a Large Herrligkoffer Team
The 1970 Siegi Löw Memorial Expedition was led by Karl Maria Herrligkoffer and included climbers from Germany, Austria and South Tyrol. Reinhold and Günther were two members of a much larger effort that fixed camps and ropes through the face.
Karl Maria Herrligkoffer
Herrligkoffer had a long, difficult history with Nanga Parbat and had already organized major attempts on the Rupal Face in 1964 and 1968.
Reinhold & Günther Messner
Reinhold was 25. Günther, his younger brother, was 23. Neither brother had previously climbed an 8,000-meter peak.
Felix Kuen & Peter Scholz
They reached the summit the following day, June 28, using the same Rupal line and then returned down the ascent side.
Why the expedition structure matters
The ascent was a siege-style team effort, but the decisive summit sequence became improvised. Once the Messner brothers were beyond Camp V without radio contact, decisions had to be made with almost no direct communication with expedition leadership.
From Camp V to Survival in the Diamir Valley
The exact details differ between later accounts, but the broad chronology is unusually well documented by expedition records, early reports and later testimony.
Camp V was established at roughly 7,350 m. A radio plan used colored rockets from Base Camp: blue for a favorable forecast, red for deteriorating weather and a fast solo summit attempt by Reinhold.
A red rocket was fired even though the forecast was favorable. Later accounts from the expedition side describe this as a signaling mistake caused by misidentifying the flare.
Reinhold left Camp V alone for the summit. Günther later abandoned rope-fixing work and climbed after him, catching up high on the mountain.
The brothers reached the summit at roughly 5 p.m., completing the first ascent of the Rupal Face. They were late, exhausted and poorly equipped for an unplanned multi-day traverse.
They bivouacked high without normal overnight equipment. Günther’s condition worsened, according to Reinhold’s account, and the brothers moved toward the Diamir side rather than descend the difficult Merkl Gully.
Near the upper mountain, Reinhold had shouted contact with Felix Kuen and Peter Scholz as those climbers approached the summit from the Rupal side. What was communicated—and what the other pair understood—later became a major point of dispute.
The Messners descended unknown terrain on the Diamir Face, including serac and glacier terrain. Reinhold later said Günther disappeared low on the descent and that fresh avalanche debris convinced him his brother had been swept away.
Reinhold, severely frostbitten and exhausted, reached the Diamir Valley and was helped by local people. The expedition still did not initially know which side of the mountain the brothers had descended.
A Tiny Communication Error Helped Change the Entire Climb
The rocket was not the cause of Günther’s death, but it was the first link in a chain that turned a planned expedition summit into a lightly equipped, improvised sequence.
The plan depended on a color signal.
The American Alpine Journal and Herrligkoffer Foundation accounts both describe a simple system: blue meant a favorable forecast and continued rope preparation; red meant worsening weather and Reinhold should make a fast solo summit attempt. A red flare was fired despite good weather.
Reinhold therefore departed early with minimal equipment. Günther was not originally paired with him for that solo push; he followed later. By the time they were together high on the route, the expedition’s planned support structure had effectively disappeared.
Why this detail matters more than the drama
High-altitude accidents rarely come from one bad choice. Here, communication ambiguity, an improvised summit pairing, late timing, limited bivouac equipment, altitude illness or exhaustion, and an unplanned descent route accumulated into one survival problem after another.
The First Ascent of the Rupal Face Was Complete. The Hardest Part Was Still Ahead.
The brothers reached the summit late in the day. Returning through the steep Merkl Gully with an exhausted partner would be difficult. Descending the unknown Diamir side was also an enormous commitment. There was no easy option.
Günther Was Not Supposed to Be Reinhold’s Summit Partner That Morning
The unplanned nature of the pairing is central to the later tragedy.
A Light, Fast Solo Attempt
Early expedition records say Reinhold left Camp V alone with minimal equipment for a fast push. He was not carrying a normal bivouac system for two people or a planned traverse of the mountain.
He Climbed After His Brother
Günther left the rope-fixing task and moved rapidly upward. He caught Reinhold high on the route, and the brothers continued together to the summit.
Did Reinhold plan the traverse before the summit?
Former expedition members later argued that he had discussed the idea of descending the Diamir side before the climb. Reinhold denied that the 1970 traverse was pre-planned and described the Diamir descent as an emergency response to Günther’s deteriorating condition and the difficulty of reversing the Rupal route. The later discovery of Günther on the Diamir side supports the fact of the shared descent, but it cannot establish Reinhold’s private intention before summit day.
The Brothers Entered an Unclimbed Descent With Almost No Margin
They were descending a side of the mountain neither had climbed, after summiting late, without a supported camp chain beneath them.
No Established Descent Line
The Diamir side had been climbed by other routes, but the brothers were not simply following a prepared trail back to their expedition.
Exhaustion & Frostbite
Reinhold survived with severe frostbite that later cost him most of his toes and parts of several fingers. Günther was described as increasingly impaired during the descent.
No Team Below Them
Once they committed to Diamir, the Rupal expedition infrastructure—fixed camps, known route and teammates—was on the other side of the mountain.
Why an avalanche remains the leading explanation
Reinhold’s account says he moved ahead on easier lower terrain, waited, climbed back when Günther did not appear, and found fresh avalanche debris in the basin where he had last seen him. The later location of Günther’s remains on the Diamir side is consistent with that broad sequence. Because no one witnessed the disappearance and the glacier moved for decades, the precise mechanism cannot be demonstrated with the same certainty as the descent side.
Why Did the Story Become One of Climbing’s Longest Feuds?
The dispute grew because the decisive events happened beyond direct observation, because expedition members interpreted earlier statements differently, and because later books reopened questions that had never been documented cleanly in real time.
| Question | Reinhold Messner’s account | Critics’ historical claim | What later evidence changes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Günther descend Diamir? | Yes, with Reinhold. | Some critics argued Günther had been sent back down Rupal. | The 2005 remains and DNA evidence on the Diamir side strongly support Reinhold on this point. |
| Was the traverse planned? | No; the Diamir descent became necessary because of Günther’s condition and retreat difficulty. | Some teammates said Reinhold had spoken earlier about a traverse as an ambitious objective. | Body location cannot prove pre-summit intention. |
| What happened during contact with Kuen and Scholz? | Reinhold later described a difficult shouted exchange in wind and an urgent need to get Günther lower. | Critics questioned why the exchange did not communicate a clear emergency. | No physical evidence can reconstruct a brief shouted conversation at extreme altitude. |
| How exactly did Günther die? | Reinhold concluded an avalanche had swept him away on the lower Diamir descent. | Alternative theories questioned the separation and sequence. | Remains confirm Diamir-side descent, but not the exact final seconds. |
The responsible conclusion is narrower than either extreme.
It is no longer reasonable to treat “Günther was sent alone down the Rupal Face” as equally supported by the evidence. The location and identification of his remains materially changed that question. But it is also too strong to say that DNA resolved every controversy. It resolved identity and descent-side evidence; it did not provide a witness to the brothers’ decisions high on the mountain.
What the Remains Proved—and What They Did Not
The discovery is the most important evidence added to the story after the expedition itself.
Günther Reached the Diamir Side
Remains, boots and clothing were found on the western side of the mountain. DNA testing in Innsbruck identified the remains as Günther Messner’s with extremely high statistical confidence.
This strongly contradicts the theory that Günther was simply sent back alone down the Rupal Face while Reinhold traversed without him.
The Glacier Is Not a Witness
The remains emerged decades later after long-term glacier movement. Their recovery location is therefore not automatically the exact place where Günther died.
The evidence cannot tell us what was said near the summit, whether a traverse had been discussed before the climb, or the exact second when the brothers became separated.
Why “case closed” is too simple
The evidence closes one major branch of the argument far more strongly than it closes the entire story. It supports a shared Diamir descent. It does not convert a two-person survival ordeal—with only one survivor—into a fully observable historical record.
The Tragedy Became the Central Event in Reinhold Messner’s Climbing Life
Reinhold survived the Diamir descent with severe frostbite. He returned to Nanga Parbat repeatedly, including searches for Günther and later the famous 1978 solo ascent of the Diamir Face.
He went on to become the first climber to summit all fourteen 8,000-meter peaks and, with Peter Habeler, the first to climb Everest without supplemental oxygen. Yet in interviews decades later, he continued to identify Günther’s death as the hardest loss of his life.
The 1970 climb therefore sits at the beginning of two stories at once: one of the most influential high-altitude careers in mountaineering history, and a private family tragedy that remained publicly contested for decades.
The 1970 Tragedy Is Most Useful When Read as an Accident Chain.
No one decision explains the outcome. Communication, summit timing, partner condition, route commitment, equipment, altitude and descent uncertainty all interacted.
What Modern Climbers Can Learn Without Pretending the Mountain Was Simple
Historical disasters are most useful when they sharpen present-day decision systems rather than turn tragedy into spectacle.
A plan that depends on one ambiguous signal is fragile. Modern expedition communication should include redundancy, confirmation and clear fallback rules when the team moves beyond radio range.
When the summit team changes unexpectedly, the equipment, pace, rescue assumptions and descent plan should be reconsidered—not simply inherited from the original plan.
A summit reached late in the day can convert a normal descent into a bivouac and a bivouac into a route-choice crisis.
At extreme altitude, the stronger climber’s pace and route preference must be adjusted to the weaker partner’s condition. A route that is possible for one person may not be survivable for the pair.
Descending an unfamiliar side of an 8,000er can remove the infrastructure that made the ascent possible: camps, fixed rope, caches, team members and known retreat points.
When only one participant survives a critical sequence, later analysis should separate physical evidence from inference and disputed testimony. Certainty should not exceed the evidence.
Nanga Parbat 1970 FAQ
Direct answers to the questions most often attached to the Messner brothers’ climb.
What happened on Nanga Parbat in 1970?
Reinhold and Günther Messner reached the summit on June 27 after making the first ascent of the Rupal Face. They descended the opposite, Diamir side. Günther died during that descent; Reinhold survived with severe frostbite and reached the valley on July 1.
How did Günther Messner die?
Reinhold concluded that Günther was swept away by an avalanche after the brothers had descended together onto the lower Diamir side. No one witnessed the final disappearance, so avalanche remains the leading explanation rather than a directly observed fact.
Did Reinhold Messner abandon his brother?
The strongest physical evidence argues against the historical claim that Günther was sent alone back down the Rupal Face. Günther’s remains were found on the Diamir side and identified by DNA. Questions about decisions and separation during the Diamir descent remain less directly observable.
Were Günther Messner’s remains ever found?
Yes. Remains and equipment recovered on the Diamir side were identified as Günther’s in 2005 through DNA testing in Innsbruck. The location strongly supports that he descended the Diamir side with Reinhold.
Did the Messner brothers make the first ascent of the Rupal Face?
Yes. Reinhold and Günther reached the summit on June 27, 1970 by the Rupal Face. Felix Kuen and Peter Scholz also reached the summit by the route the following day.
What was the red rocket on Nanga Parbat?
The expedition used colored rockets to communicate weather information to climbers above radio range. A red rocket—meant to signal worsening weather and trigger Reinhold’s solo summit attempt—was fired despite a favorable forecast, according to expedition accounts.
Was the traverse of Nanga Parbat planned?
Reinhold said the Diamir descent became an emergency choice after the summit because Günther was exhausted or altitude-sick and reversing the Rupal route was too difficult. Some former teammates later said Reinhold had previously discussed a traverse. The surviving physical evidence cannot prove intent before summit day.
Why is the 1970 climb historically important?
It completed the first ascent of the huge Rupal Face and Reinhold’s survival completed a traverse from Rupal to Diamir. The tragedy also became one of the most debated case studies in Himalayan expedition communication, descent risk and historical evidence.
Use Contemporary Expedition Records for the Timeline and Later Forensic Evidence for the Dispute
No single memoir can independently prove every disputed moment. This account prioritizes early expedition records, later physical evidence and clearly attributed disagreements.
Source caution
Several important participants later published competing accounts, and the controversy became entangled with personal disputes and litigation. This page does not treat later accusation or memoir as equivalent to physical evidence. When accounts conflict, the disagreement is labeled rather than resolved by assertion.
Nanga Parbat: Route History, Risk, Accident Evidence & the Wider 8,000er Record
This page owns the 1970 Messner tragedy. Use the mountain and disaster parents for context, then move into the route, difficulty, summit-data and accident-analysis pages below.
Two Brothers Reached the Summit. Only One Came Home.
The Rupal Face ascent became mountaineering history. Günther’s death turned it into something more difficult: a story about survival, evidence, memory and the limits of certainty when the most important moments happen with no witness left to speak.
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