Last updated October 5, 2026
Nanga Parbat 1937: The Great Avalanche at Camp IV
Just after midnight on June 15, 1937, a serac broke above the German expedition’s Camp IV on the upper Rakhiot Glacier. Ice blocks accelerated across deep, cold powder snow and mobilized an avalanche that crossed terrain previously considered protective. The camp was buried where it stood. Seven European climbers and nine Sherpa high-altitude porters—16 people in all—were killed in one of the defining disasters of early Himalayan mountaineering.
What Happened in the 1937 Nanga Parbat Avalanche?
A serac broke from an ice terrace roughly 300–400 meters above Camp IV during the night of June 14–15. Under ordinary conditions, expedition investigators believed ice from that cliff should have stopped on a nearly level section above camp. But more than 10 feet of recent snow had remained exceptionally cold and powdery. The falling ice accelerated across that low-friction surface and set the entire snow layer moving.
The avalanche swept about 150 meters across the level glacier and reached Camp IV. The tents were not carried away; they were crushed and buried under hard-packed snow and ice, roughly 9–10 feet below the debris surface. Recovered diaries contained entries from June 14, and several watches had stopped shortly after midnight. The expedition’s reconstruction therefore placed the catastrophe just after midnight on June 15.
Nanga Parbat 1937: Disaster Reconstruction
The Disaster Happened on the Rakhiot Side, High Above Today’s Fairy Meadows Approach
The expedition climbed from the north via the Rakhiot Glacier—the same broad side used in the German attempts of 1932 and 1934 and by Hermann Buhl for the first ascent in 1953.
Fairy Meadows · Rakhiot Glacier · Nanga Parbat
The historical Camp IV position is shown only as an approximate upper-glacier zone. No precise 1937 GPS coordinate exists in the sources used here.
Nanga Parbat Had Already Killed Ten People in 1934.
The 1937 team returned to the same broad Rakhiot route with better preparation and a deliberate plan to harden high camps against storms. The catastrophe that followed was not a repeat of the 1934 blizzard—it was a different failure mode entirely.
Karl Wien Returned to Finish What the 1934 Team Could Not
After the 1934 disaster, German Himalayan organizers debated whether to abandon Nanga Parbat. Karl Wien instead accepted leadership of another attempt, backed by the German Himalaya Foundation.
Karl Wien
Geographer and experienced alpinist who had climbed in Sikkim and was chosen to lead the 1937 return to Nanga Parbat.
Rakhiot Face
The expedition reused the northern route pioneered in earlier German attempts, building camps from the lower icefall toward the Rakhiot Peak and Silver Saddle.
Storm-Proof the Upper Route
From Camp V upward, the plan called for ice caves stocked with food, stoves, mattresses and sleeping bags so upper teams could withstand bad weather and retreat safely.
The team was not ignoring avalanche danger.
Contemporary records show repeated avalanche observations, camp-site changes lower on the glacier and deliberate trenching of tents. That makes the Camp IV failure historically important: experienced climbers can manage known hazards and still be exposed to a low-frequency runout that exceeds prior experience.
The Mountain Had Been Sending Avalanche Signals for Weeks
The final Camp IV avalanche was surprising in reach, but the 1937 expedition had already experienced repeated ice and snow movement lower on the route.
A large hanging-glacier collapse near Camp II generated a powerful powder blast that tore down tents, broke poles and threw people and loads around. No one was killed.
Persistent snowfall pinned climbers at Camp II. Hartmann and Pfeffer dug their tent roughly six feet into the snow for protection.
When climbers returned to Camp II, another avalanche had damaged the provision tent.
Storms continued high on the mountain; part of the terrace near Camp II broke away, prompting the following group to change that camp’s position.
Camp IV was occupied above 20,000 feet. Heavy snow and extreme cold then repeatedly delayed movement toward Camp V.
June 14 Began as the Best Weather Day the Team Had Seen in Weeks
That contrast—improving weather followed by catastrophe—is one reason the event shocked contemporary mountaineers.
The track toward Camp V had been prepared. Teams were poised to move higher as the weather finally showed signs of improvement.
British liaison officer D. M. B. Smart left Camp IV for Base Camp with five sick porters, carrying the last expedition message from the high camp.
Wien, Göttner, Hartmann and porters carried loads toward Camp V and returned. Diary entries describe warmth in the sun, rising morale and expectations that Camp V might soon be occupied.
At least Hartmann and Pfeffer added late entries to their diaries. Sixteen people settled into the tents at Camp IV.
A serac broke from the ice terrace above. The ice mobilized deep powder snow and the avalanche crossed the flat glacier to bury the camp.
Ulrich Luft climbed toward Camp IV and found a field of avalanche debris where the camp should have been. With no tools capable of penetrating the refrozen mass, he returned for help.
The Serac Was Only the Trigger. The Snowpack Turned It Into the Disaster.
Investigators believed the ice alone should have stopped well above camp. The unusual combination of heavy snowfall and persistent deep cold left a broad layer of low-density powder that allowed the collapse to keep moving.
Four Conditions Combined to Defeat a Site That Had Previously Appeared Safe
The 1938 Himalayan Journal reconstruction is unusually specific about the physical chain.
| Evidence | What investigators found | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Debris field | Approximately 400 m long and 150 m wide on the level glacier. | The avalanche reached far beyond where earlier experience suggested serac debris should stop. |
| Tents | Buried in place rather than swept far downhill. | The fatal process was deep burial and crushing by hard-packed snow and ice. |
| Burial depth | Camp lay roughly 9–10 ft below the debris surface. | Immediate self-rescue was effectively impossible. |
| Sleeping bags | Recovered victims appeared to have been asleep when buried. | There was little or no warning time. |
| Watches & diaries | Diaries had June 14 entries; watches stopped shortly after midnight. | These fixed the true disaster date more accurately than delayed early news reports. |
Was Camp IV Placed in an Obviously Unsafe Location?
The historical evidence argues against that simple interpretation.
The same general site had survived earlier expeditions.
The post-disaster account says Camp IV had been used for weeks in 1932 and 1934 without avalanches reaching the camp. The final 200 meters above it were nearly level, and falling serac ice was expected to stop roughly 150 meters above the tents.
What changed in 1937 was the runout system: exceptionally heavy snowfall, very cold powder and unusually active glacier movement. The lesson is not that prior safe use proves a camp safe forever. It is that runout can change when snow conditions change the mobility of falling ice.
A modern reading should avoid hindsight certainty.
Today we would ask harder questions about overhead serac exposure and low-frequency runout. But it is misleading to portray the 1937 team as camping beneath an avalanche path they already knew routinely reached the tents. The contemporary record says the opposite.
The Disaster Is Often Remembered Through Its European Climbers. Nine Sherpa Porters Died Beside Them.
Early expedition history frequently centered the foreign leaders. A complete account has to name the high-altitude workers who repeatedly returned to Nanga Parbat after the 1934 losses and were sleeping in Camp IV that night.
Seven Climbers and Nine Sherpa High-Altitude Porters
Spellings vary across German, British and later mountaineering records. The forms below follow the most common modern transcriptions while preserving that uncertainty.
European expedition members
- Karl Wien — expedition leader
- Hans Hartmann — physician and high-altitude researcher
- Günther Hepp — climber
- Adolf Göttner — climber
- Pert Fankhauser — Austrian climber
- Martin Pfeffer — climber
- Peter Müllritter — climber and expedition photographer
Sherpa high-altitude porters
- Pasang Norbu — also recorded as Pasang “Picture”
- Chong Karma
- Karmi
- Gyalgen Monjo
- Mingma Tsering
- Nima Tsering I
- Nima Tsering II
- Ang Tsering II
- Tigmay / Jigmay
Pasang Norbu’s recovery is especially well documented.
During the July search, rescuers located the Sherpa tent beneath roughly 10 feet of snow and ice and uncovered Pasang in his sleeping bag. The remaining porter victims were left in place after Sirdar Nursang said that further disturbance would not accord with their religious wishes.
The Camp Vanished So Completely That Luft First Found Only Debris
Three days after the accident, Ulrich Luft climbed alone toward Camp IV and reached the avalanche field around midday on June 18.
The Camp Was Gone
Luft found no tents—only avalanche debris and several rucksacks. Without digging tools, he could not penetrate the frozen mass and descended for help.
International Relief Effort
Paul Bauer, Fritz Bechtold and Karl von Kraus flew from Europe; the Royal Air Force helped move them rapidly toward Gilgit with recovery equipment.
The Tents Were Found
Searchers used long probes and deep trenches. They recovered Pasang and five European climbers. The tent containing Müllritter and Göttner could not be found before the search had to end.
The recovery itself showed how dynamic the glacier remained.
By July, new serac falls, widening crevasses and additional snowfall had changed the route and the debris field. The search party described Camp IV as buried beneath a surface that no longer resembled the one Luft had first seen in June.
The Avalanche Happened June 15—Not June 20.
Some newspapers reported June 20 because that was when the news reached the outside world. The recovered diaries, camp movements and stopped watches later fixed the disaster to the night of June 14–15.
Why Contemporary Newspapers Sometimes Say June 20
In 1937, Himalayan news moved by runner, telegraph and cable. The first outside reports were written before rescuers had reconstructed the event.
News Arrived Days Late
Initial agency reports dated the catastrophe around June 20 and even briefly suggested Karl Wien might have survived. Those were communications dates, not reliable event reconstruction.
June 14–15 Is the Historical Date
Smart had left Camp IV on June 14. Diaries recovered from the tents contained June 14 entries, including late-evening notes, and watches had stopped shortly after midnight.
The Disaster Deepened Nanga Parbat’s “Mountain of Fate” Reputation
By 1937, German expeditions had already lost heavily on the mountain. The new avalanche intensified a national narrative that extended far beyond climbing.
A mountaineering tragedy also became political memory.
Nature described the catastrophe at the time as probably the greatest Himalayan disaster yet known. In Germany, the earlier 1934 deaths and the 1937 losses were folded into a powerful “Nanga Parbat” national narrative during the Nazi era. Later scholarship has shown how those deaths were memorialized and used in stories of sacrifice, loyalty and national purpose.
The historical lesson is therefore twofold: the avalanche changed expedition risk thinking, and the public story of the dead was shaped by the politics of the period in which they died.
What the 1937 Avalanche Still Teaches
The goal is not to judge 1937 with modern tools. It is to identify risk principles that remain valid.
| Lesson | 1937 evidence | Modern application |
|---|---|---|
| Past safety is not proof of future safety | Camp IV had been used in 1932 and 1934 without avalanche runout reaching it. | Reassess runout when snowpack, glacier movement or serac geometry changes. |
| Trigger and transport are different problems | The serac was the trigger; cold powder snow extended the runout. | Evaluate what falling ice can entrain—not only where the ice itself would land. |
| Consequence grows with concentration | Sixteen people slept in one camp. | Where practical, reduce exposure time and avoid concentrating an entire team beneath one objective hazard. |
| Low-frequency hazards still count | The runout exceeded what prior expeditions had experienced. | Camp planning should include credible worst cases, not just the most common avalanche path. |
| Evidence after an accident matters | Diaries, watches, debris geometry and burial depth allowed a physical reconstruction. | Separate evidence from hindsight narratives when analyzing accidents. |
Nanga Parbat 1937 Avalanche FAQ
Direct answers to the main historical questions around the disaster.
How many people died in the 1937 Nanga Parbat avalanche?
Sixteen people died: seven European expedition members and nine Sherpa high-altitude porters sleeping at Camp IV.
When did the Nanga Parbat avalanche happen?
The disaster occurred just after midnight during the night of June 14–15, 1937. Some early newspaper reports gave later dates because the news took days to reach the outside world.
What caused the 1937 avalanche?
A serac broke from an ice terrace above Camp IV. Falling ice traveled over deep, exceptionally cold powder snow, mobilizing the snow layer and creating a runout long enough to reach the camp.
Where was Camp IV?
Camp IV was on the upper Rakhiot Glacier at roughly 20,280 feet, or about 6,180 meters, below Rakhiot Peak on the north side of Nanga Parbat.
Was Camp IV known to be avalanche-prone?
The post-disaster account says the site had been used in 1932 and 1934 without avalanches reaching it. Investigators believed unusual snow and glacier conditions in 1937 allowed the avalanche to cross normally protective level terrain.
Who led the 1937 Nanga Parbat expedition?
Karl Wien, a German geographer and experienced mountaineer, led the expedition. He was among the seven European climbers killed at Camp IV.
Were the bodies recovered?
Searchers later recovered Pasang Norbu and five European climbers from deeply buried tents. The tent containing Peter Müllritter and Adolf Göttner was not found before the recovery effort ended, and the remaining Sherpa victims were left in place in accordance with the wishes communicated by Sirdar Nursang.
Was the 1937 Nanga Parbat avalanche the deadliest mountaineering disaster of its time?
It was one of the deadliest single accidents in early Himalayan mountaineering. Nature described it in 1937 as probably the greatest Himalayan disaster then known. Later mountaineering disasters surpassed its toll.
The Best Evidence Comes From the 1938 Himalayan Journal Reconstruction
Later summaries are useful, but the strongest reconstruction uses the expedition’s own diaries, recovery work and physical observations published shortly after the event.
Historical-source caution
Names from Himalayan expeditions of this era were transcribed inconsistently, especially the names of Sherpa workers. This page uses common modern spellings and flags variants rather than pretending the archival record is perfectly standardized.
Nanga Parbat: Route History, Fatality Data & Avalanche Lessons
This page owns the 1937 Camp IV avalanche. Use the mountain and disaster parents for broader context, then move into Nanga Parbat’s route, risk and later-tragedy pages.
Sixteen People Went to Sleep at Camp IV. None Woke Up.
The 1937 avalanche remains a stark reminder that the most consequential Himalayan hazards can be objective, low-frequency and almost impossible to outrun once the chain begins.
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